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Yun Isang, Media, and the State: Forgetting and
Remembering a Dissident Composer in Cold-War South Korea
Hyun Kyong Hannah Chang
Abstract:  Yun  Isang  (1917-95)  was  one  of
Korea’s  most  prominent  composers  in  the
twentieth  century.  From  1957,  the  year  he
moved to West Germany, to his death in 1995,
he  had  an  internationally  illustrious  career,
garnering critical acclaim in Europe, Japan, the
United  States,  and  North  Korea.  In  South
Korea,  however,  he  became  a  controversial
figure  after  he  was  embroiled  in  a  national
security  scandal  in  1967.  As  part  of  this
incident, dubbed the East Berlin Affair at the
time, Yun Isang was abducted in West Germany
by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and
charged with espionage for North Korea. This
experience of victimization, which also included
torture,  imprisonment,  and  an  initial  death
sentence, turned him into a vocal critic of Park
Chung Hee and an overseas unification activist
in  contact  with  North  Korea.  This  article
remembers the moral and political framings of
Yun Isang in South Korea against a recurring
politics of forgetting that masks the magnitude
of  violence that  was wielded in the name of
national security. It traces coverage of Yun in
several mainstream newspapers from the first
mention of his name in 1952 to 1995. It argues
that representations of Yun were mediated by a
tension between national artistic progress and
national  security,  one of  the central  tensions
that defined South Korea’s Cold-War cultural
politics.
 
Keywords: Yun Isang, Cold War, South Korea,
West Germany, North Korea, East Berlin Affair,
European avant-garde 
 
Yun Isang (1917-95) was one of a small number
of  composers  from  South  Korea  who  had  a
prominent career in postwar Western Europe.
Born  near  the  southern  city  of  Tongyeong
(T’ongyŏng)  in  Japan-colonized  Korea,  Yun
studied  composition  and  cello  at  the  Osaka
School  of  Music  in  1935.  In  post-liberation
Korea, he was a promising composer in Seoul.
In 1956, he left for Paris to study composition
and settled in West Berlin in the following year.
From  1960,  as  his  works  were  selected  for
prestigious music festivals, Yun found himself
an  emerging  figure  in  the  European  avant-
garde.  He  garnered  praise  especially  for
compositions  that  were  influenced  by
traditional Korean music. From the early 1970s
until  his  death  in  1995,  his  music  was
performed  in  big  and  small  concerts  in
Germany,  Japan,  the  United  States,  France,
North  Korea,  and  beyond.  Reflecting  his
international  esteem,  Yun  also  attracted
diverse  students,  including  Toshio  Hosokawa
from  Japan,  Jolyon  Brettingham  Smith  from
Great Britain,  and Conrado del  Rosario from
the  Philippines.  But  there  was  one  country
where his name was under constant threat of
erasure: South Korea.
Yun Isang’s strained relations with his native
country  began  during  the  Park  Chung  Hee
regime (1961-79). In summer of 1967, Yun was
abducted by members of South Korea’s Korean
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Central  Information  Agency  (KCIA)  in  West
Berlin and forced onto a Seoul-bound flight. He
was one of  the 34 South Koreans who were
arrested in Western Europe as part of the East
Berlin  Affair,  a  counter-espionage  round-up
that the KCIA staged with little evidence. Yun,
who had visited North Korea from Europe in
1963, was charged with espionage for North
Korea.  He  was  tortured,  tried,  and  given  a
death sentence.1 Meanwhile, his abduction had
caused West German, Japanese, and American
colleagues to form action committees in Bonn,
Washington D.C., and Tokyo, in order to raise
awareness of the human rights abuse involved
in  Yun’s  extradition  and  indictment.  One
particularly  powerful  campaign  came  from
Wilhelm  Maler,  the  president  of  the  Freie
Akademie der Künste in Hamburg at the time.
He drafted an appeal for Yun’s release that was
signed by such luminaries as Igor Stravinsky,
Karlheinz Stockhausen, György Ligeti, Herbert
von Karajan, and Mauricio Raúl Kagel. Due to
this and many other international campaigns,
Yun was released from prison and was allowed
to  return to  West  Germany in  the  spring of
1969. 
From  this  point  on,  Yun  Isang  was  an
inconvenient figure for the Park regime. As a
reminder of state violence, he also became an
icon of opposition within South Korean cultures
of resistance, but any public discourse about
Yun  had  to  be  shaped  care fu l l y  and
strategically  as  it  was  under  the  state’s
surveilling  eyes.  As  former  dissidents  have
attested, in the 1970s, even mentioning Yun’s
name was considered a  subversive  act.2  Yun
became an  even  more  delicate  subject  after
1973 as he transformed himself  into a vocal
overseas critic of Park and a unification activist
in contact with North Korea. He would never
again set foot in South Korea.
The victimization of Yun under the Park Chung
Hee regime is no longer a sensitive subject in
South Korea, where a number of famed former
dissidents have entered congressional politics
and  the  presidency  since  1998.  However,
almost  three  decades  of  state-centered
narratives  and  media’s  self-censorship
surrounding Yun have left  a legacy of taboo,
and  to  date,  there  are  no  comprehensive
studies that document the ways in which Yun
Isang  was  represented  and  discussed  in  the
South  Korean  media  during  his  career.
Scholarship on Yun in English and Korean has
tended  to  focus  on  stylistic  analysis  of  his
compositions,  celebrating  the  ways  in  which
Yun  tested  the  boundaries  of  Western  art
music,  rather  than  addressing  the  ways  in
which he contested the boundaries of political
and  moral  legitimacy.3  While  these  largely
musicological  studies  make  a  significant
contribution to scholarship usually dominated
by  preoccupation  with  Euro-American
composers, they have left under-explored Yun’s
contested relationship with South Korea – as a
victim of the brutality of the Park regime, as a
democratization  and  unification  activist  in
contact with North Korea, and as a celebrated
composer. 
This article remembers the political and moral
framings  of  Yun  in  Cold-War  South  Korea
against a recurring politics of forgetting that
masks  the  magnitude  of  violence  that  was
wielded  in  the  name  of  national  security.  I
examine accounts about Yun in South Korean
newspapers from the first mention of his name
in 1952 to his death in 1995, drawing on more
than seventy articles in three papers that were
vulnerable  to  state  pressure  –  Tonga  Ilbo,
Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, and Maeil Kyŏngje (after
1988, I also bring in a number of articles from
the dissident newspaper Hankyoreh). To search
for Yun Isang in mainstream newspapers in the
second  half  of  the  twentieth  century  –
particularly during the Park and Chun regimes
and to some extent during the Kim Young Sam
administration – is to be overwhelmed by the
collaborative  relationship  between  the  media
and the state. Of course, the media was not an
official mouthpiece of the state, and individual
journalists at various times sought to negotiate
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the terms of what could and could not be said
about Yun and other dissidents. But reports on
known dissident figures tended to conform to
official Cold-War narratives, attesting to a print
culture where writers of any stripe, including
those  with  activist  leanings,  had  to  use  the
frames of hegemonic discourse if Yun’s name
was to be printed in public documents.
The state’s influence on the press, however, did
not  mean  that  the  newspapers  published  a
uniform image of Yun across the decades. Yun
proved to be a challenging figure to represent
as he confounded the two-part commitment of
the state to “the display of ‘South Korea’… as a
developmentalist space at once opposing and
mirroring its northern counterpart in the global
Cold  War.”4  As  I  argue,  a  tension  between
notions  of  artistic  progress  and  national
security pervaded newspaper reports on Yun.
On one side, Yun’s success in Western Europe
strongly  resonated  with  the  developmentalist
discourse that had shaped even the sphere of
art and music in post-colonial, Cold-War South
Korea. Yun’s success made him an exemplar of
South  Korea’s  ascendance  within  artistic
cultures of the Cold War’s Western bloc. On the
other  side,  Yun’s  contacts  with  North  Korea
and  his  activism  around  national  unification
could not be assimilated into state’s national
security ideology, which required an excision of
North Korea and any elements associated with
it. I highlight the tension between the desire to
claim exemplars of national progress and the
problem of regulating their political criticisms
as  a  persistent  feature  of  Cold  War  cultural
politics in South Korea, as elsewhere. 
In what follows, I  organize the receptions of
Yun  Isang  into  seven  periods,  based  on
perceptible shifts in the tone and message of
news coverage. The first two sections examine
news articles published prior to the East Berlin
Affair,  exploring  the  lesser-known  stories  of
Yun’s breakthroughs in South Korea and West
Germany.  The  subsequent  sections  consider
how  the  press  represented  Yun  during  and
a f t e r  t h e  I n c i d e n t  a n d  h o w  t h e s e
representations swayed in response to changes
in  the  domestic  political  climate  and  Yun’s
international activities. 
1952-55: Recognition in South Korea 
The East Berlin Affair of 1967 promoted Yun’s
image as an overseas South Korean dissident in
the Western imagination, but references to his
name in South Korean newspapers before his
departure to Germany contest this association.
These  early  references  from the  early-to-mid
1950s  demonstrate  that  Yun  moved  in
mainstream  cultural  organizations  structured
by  South  Korea’s  anti-communist,  pro-U.S.
stance in the wake of the Korean War. One of
the early new articles (if  not the earliest)  to
mention Yun is from March 1952, in the midst
of the Korean War. It advertised a concert of
operettas  and  film  music  organized  by  the
W a r t i m e  C o m p o s e r s ’  A s s o c i a t i o n
(chŏnsijakkokka hyŏphoe) at a café.5 Yun was
one of  the  two composers  whose music  was
featured. Other mentions from the early 1950s
link  Yun  to  a  number  of  establishment
organizations, such as the Korean Composers
Association (han’guk chakkokka hyŏphoe) and
the Music Fan Club (myujik p’en k’ŭllŏp).6
At this time, what distinguished Yun from many
of his contemporary composers in South Korea
was not his politics but his attempt to write art
music  at  the  juncture  of  modernism  and
nativism. Chŏn Pongch’o, a music professor at
Seoul National University, was one of the first
critics  to  write  about  Yun’s  attempt  to
synthesize  Western  musical  modernism  and
Korean aesthetics.  In  his  rave  review of  the
composer’s  piano  trio  and string  quartet  for
Tonga Ilbo in 1955, Chŏn wrote:
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I n  t h e s e  t w o  w o r k s ,  I  f e e l  t h e
undercurrents  of  our  ancestors’  sorrow
and happiness, love for one’s hometown,
and the smell of the earth. In the music
dwells a kind of national religion from the
three southern provinces, which Yun Isang
possesses in  his  body.  They are musical
paintings…in  which  a  sense  of  Eastern
mystery and a people’s tradition compete
seriously with a modern consciousness.7
 
Chŏn’s review is significant as one of the first
pieces  of  music  criticism  to  note  Yun’s
intercultural style. As such, it prefigured later
Western  and  Japanese  critics’  evaluation  of
Yun’s works. 
In his Tonga Ilbo review, Chŏn added that Yun
was  a  more  advanced  composer  than  his
Korean peers, describing the reviewed pieces
as “a revolution…produced in a country where
people  who  harmonize  children’s  songs  call
themselves  composers.”  Such  an  evaluation,
while divulging Chon’s condescending attitude
toward  South  Korean  composers  in  the
mid-1950s,  nevertheless  sheds  light  on  the
historical circumstances under which Western
music  entered  Korea  in  the  early  twentieth
century. Western music was introduced as part
of  Japanese  colonial  education  and  U.S.
religious  missionary  activity,  rather  than  as
concert-hall repertoire. Due to these historical
beginnings,  Korean  composers  of  this  music
who came of  age  during the  colonial  period
(1910-45)  tended to  write  for  educational  or
Christian initiatives, rather than for the concert
hall.  It  is  interesting  to  note  how  Yun’s
trajectory both conformed to and contested the
career patterns of his generation. Like many of
his contemporaries, he studied Western music
first with U.S. missionaries in Korea and then
studied composition in Japan in the late 1930s,
beginning at the Osaka School of  Music and
later with Ikenouchi Tomojirō.8 However, unlike
many  of  his  contemporaries,  Yun  aspired  to
write  art  music  in  the  vein  of  Western
modernism. 
In 1956, the 39-year-old Yun went to Paris to
further  his  composition  studies,  thanks  to  a
Seoul  City  Cultural  Award  he  received.
Kyŏnghyang Sinmun and Tonga Ilbo advertised
a farewell gathering organized by the Korean
Composers  Association  and  Music  Fan  Club,
treating his forthcoming voyage as an affair of
national importance.9 
1956-66: Overseas Success at a Time of
Domestic Transition
After  a  year  at  the  Paris  Conservatory,  Yun
moved to West Germany in 1957 and studied
with Boris Blacher at the Berlin University of
the Arts. Thereafter, Yun’s reputation grew in
the  contemporary  art  music  scene  in  West
Germany.  A  turning point  was  attending the
Darmstadt  International  Summer  Course  for
New Music  in  1958.  This  annual  event  had
become a key locus of support and network for
male avant-garde and experimental composers
from the United States and Western Europe by
the mid-1950s. Composers from Latin America
and Asia made up a minority. Darmstadt gave
Yun the opportunity to get to know established
and  new  composers  and  to  become  familiar
with the latest trends. Among the composers he
interacted with at Darmstadt in 1958 was John
Cage  (1912-92),  who  was  perhaps  the  most
influential  figure  in  the  trans-Atlantic  avant-
garde  at  this  time,  and  Paik  Nam  June
(1932-2006), a Korea-born artist who had lived
in Hong Kong and Japan before moving to West
Germany in 1956.10  Yun’s experiences at this
center of new music helped him join a small
number of  East  Asian composers  who would
become  participants  of  the  Euro-American
avant-garde  in  the  1960s  and  70s.  Such
composers  included  Yun,  Paik,  the  Japanese
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composer  Ichiyanagi  Toshi,  and  the  Chinese
American composer Chou Wen-Chung.11 
Figure 1: Paik Nam June (left) and Yun
Isang in Darmstadt, 1958.
Figure 2: from left, Paik Nam June, Yun
Isang, Nomura Yoshio, and John Cage.
Darmstadt, 1958.
 
After  1958,  Yun’s  works  were  selected  to
premiere  at  prestigious  festivals  –  Music  for
Seven Instruments in Darmstadt (1959),  Five
Pieces for Piano in Bilthoven (1959), and String
Quartet No. 3 in Cologne (1960). In 1962, the
Berlin  Radio  Symphony  Orchestra  premiered
Bara, a piece that alluded to a Korean Buddhist
ceremony. Each of these successes delayed his
plan  to  return  to  Seoul.  A  Ford  Foundation
grant in 1964 enabled him to bring his family
from South Korea,  making his move to West
Germany permanent.
Two South Korean news articles involving Yun
Isang  in  the  wake  of  his  first  European
breakthroughs were written by Yun himself. In
1960, Yun wrote to Kyŏnghyang Sinmun twice
from West Germany, and both correspondences
demonstrate that he saw himself not only as a
part of his adopted world in West Germany but
also as an extension of South Korea’s art and
music  scene.  The  first  of  these,  a  letter
addressed  to  the  public,  appeared  in  the
newspaper’s  May  21  issue.12  Yun  briefly
described  Music  for  Seven  Instruments  and
reported that it was performed or broadcast in
West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, France,
Japan, and Denmark. This letter also signaled
that Yun was closely following South Korean
politics from West Germany: the opening pays
homage to “the many students who shed blood
for  their  country,”  referring  to  large-scale
street protests of April 1960, which had ousted
the then-president Syngman Rhee following a
f raudu len t  e l ec t i on .  Yun ’ s  second
correspondence  passed  on  the  news  of  a
forthcoming Japanese art exhibition in a West
German  gallery.  Kyŏnghyang  Sinmun,
paraphrasing  Yun’s  letter,  reported  that  this
gallery was hoping to include “the works of six
contemporary painters in the Korean art scene,
who  can  rank  w i th  or  surpass  pos t -
impressionist  painters  who  represent  Japan’s
younger generation.”13 That Yun took it as his
duty  to  pass  on  this  news  to  South  Korean
readers suggests that he was eager to increase
Korean  representation  relative  to  Japanese
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representation  in  West  Germany’s  art  scene.  
After 1960, there is no record of Yun’s direct
correspondence  wi th  South  Korean
newspapers.  One factor,  other  than his  busy
schedule at the time, is his disappointment with
political  developments  in  South  Korea.
According  to  Der  Verwundete  Drache  (The
Wounded  Dragon),  a  book-length  interview
with Yun by the writer Luise Rinser published
in 1977, Yun was shocked by the news of Park
Chung  Hee’s  rise  to  power  through  military
coup  (the  full  Korean  translation  of  this
interview  was  not  published  until  1988).14
Park’s  “military  revolution”  fundamentally
changed South Korean society: it elevated the
military as the most authoritative ruling body
and  empowered  a  regime  that  justified  its
brutality  by  citing  the  need  to  eliminate
communist and pro-North Korean elements in
South Korean society.  It  became increasingly
difficult for the press to maintain autonomy as
the  Park  regime  sought  to  punish  or  co-opt
dissenting  journalism  through  intimidation,
financial retaliation and the National Security
Act. It is instructive that within six months of
the coup, Park’s Revolutionary Court executed
Cho  Yongsu,  the  owner  of  a  center-left
newspaper  that  had  been  opposed  to  the
conservatives’  hardline  policy  against  North
Korea over the objection of  the International
Press Institute.15 
Yun no longer maintained an active relationship
with the mainstream South Korean press after
1960, but favorable mentions of Yun increased,
reflecting  the  cosmopolitan  aspirations  of
South  Korea’s  cultural  scene.  Articles  from
1961 to 1962 show that South Korea’s regional
and national institutions conferred awards on
Yun.16 In 1964, Tonga Ilbo took note of profiles
of  Yun  in  West  German  newspapers  The
Telegraph and Der Tagesspiegel’s.17 In 1965, a
contemporary music festival organized in Seoul
cited Yun as inspiration for the event.18 Yun’s
premieres in Hanover and Berlin in 1965 and
1 9 6 6  w e r e  t o u t e d  a s  “ o v e r s e a s
accomplishments,” and the premiere of Reak at
the  1966  Donaueschingen  Festival  was
summarized as “our music making a mark in
West Germany.”19 In February 1967, only five
months  before  Yun’s  forced  return  to  Seoul,
Hwang Byungki,  then  an  emerging  figure  in
Korean  traditional  music,  praised  Reak,
describing it as a “fine work that reconstituted
the  traditional  aesthetics  of  Korean  music
through  modern  music  techniques”20  (see
below).  Clearly,  Yun’s  recognition  in  Europe
strongly  resonated  with  the  rising  desire  of
South  Korean  society  for  recognition  in  the
Cold War’s western bloc, especially given the
dearth of overseas figures who were seen to
represent South Korea. 
 
Youtube video of Reak
 
The overwhelmingly positive reception of Yun
was felt  in  Seoul’s  art  music  scene as  well.
Yun’s pieces were included in concerts more
frequently than before (see Figure 3). Almost
all  of  the  performed  pieces  were  short  art
songs, which were much easier to learn, stage,
and  appreciate,  rather  than  challenging
instrumental compositions like Reak, which Yun
came to be known for in West Germany. This
leaning toward art songs reflected not only the
musical taste of the concert-going public, but
also the dearth of performance infrastructure
for contemporary Western art  music in early
1960s  Seoul.  For  example,  there  was  no
professional  orchestra  dedicated  solely  to
experimental  music.  However,  at  least  one
news article from 1960 tells us that a music
café played a recording of Yun’s instrumental
pieces  –  Music  for  Seven  Instruments  in
Darmstadt  (1959),  Five  Pieces  for  Piano  in
Bilthoven  (1959),  and  String  Quartet  No.  3
(1960).2 1  This  café,  the  now-legendary
Renaissance  music  room  (Runessangsŭ
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ŭmaksil),  was  a  mecca  for  college-educated
aficionados of European classical music.
Figure 3: number of concerts during
which Yun’s work(s) was performed in
South Korea, annually from 1952 to
1995. Compiled by the author based on
reports of concerts in Tonga Ilbo,
Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, Maeil Kyŏngje,
and Hankyoreh.
1967-68:  Defamed  and  Romanticized
during  the  East  Berlin  Affair  
In the summer of 1967, Yun’s positive image
was abruptly overturned, and performances of
his music halted in South Korea (see Figure 3).
On  June  17,  Yun  was  kidnapped  in  West
Germany and forced onto a Seoul-bound flight
by  the  Korean  Central  Intelligence  Agency
(KCIA), Park Chung Hee’s main instrument for
political control. Yun’s extradition was part of a
roundup that arrested approximately 34 South
Koreans  in  Western  Europe  on  charges  of
espionage for North Korea. Among the arrested
were Lee Ung-no, a celebrated painter in Paris;
Pak Nosu, an international law researcher at
Cambridge;  and  Ch’ŏn  Pyŏnghŭi,  a  German
literature  student  at  Heidelberg  University.
Later  accounts  and  testimonies  reveal  that
these  arrests  and  the  ensuing  torture  were
based  on  the  KCIA’s  inflated  and  alarmist
reading of a philosophy scholar’s “confession”
about  the  possible  vulnerability  of  South
Koreans in Europe to the reach of the North
Korean state.22 These accounts also tell us that
Park Chung Hee had much to gain by raising
the threat  of  North Korea in the summer of
1967 as he sought to stifle growing protests
against his efforts to abolish term limits for the
presidency  by  controlling  the  national
assembly. In this context,  the KCIA staged a
national security crisis to hamper the protests
and to steer public opinion in Park’s favor, a
tactic that the Park regime used multiple times
in the face of popular dissent.23
The  arrest  of  overseas  Koreans  became  the
headline for major newspapers on July 8 (see
Figure  4).  These  initial  reports,  replete  with
direct quotations from the KCIA’s statements,
were little more than a retelling of the state’s
official  narrative.  Consider,  for  example,  the
report in Kyŏnghyang Sinmun:
 
This  operation  team  is  the  largest
organizat ion  of  spies  engaged  in
international  espionage  in  the  West  and
domestically, and it is notable for including
university  professors,  doctors,  artists,
government  workers,  and  renowned
figures,  as  well  as  young  intellectuals.
According to the announcement, most of
them  were  lured  into  the  recruitment
operations  of  the  North  Korean  puppet
regime [pukkoe],  which is  based in East
Berlin,  while  they  were  studying  in
Western Europe. They were then lured to
Pyongyang  via  the  People’s  Republic  of
China and the Soviet Union, admitted into
the Communist Party, and given funds to
further  their  studies  or  obtain  doctoral
degrees. After their studies, some of them
came back to South Korea with the mission
to  infiltrate  politics,  academia,  press,
administration,  or  legislation.24  
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The  uncritical  subscription  to  the  KCIA’s
position in this and other newspapers in the
wake of the roundup exemplified the media’s
docility under Park.25 This was especially true
of  Kyŏnghyang Sinmun.  While  today it  leans
toward progressive and centrist  reporting,  in
1964,  it  was  auctioned off  to  an  automobile
corporation  by  the  government  after  the
paper’s  owner  challenged  Park’s  media
censorship.26
 
 
Figure 4: “Arrest of North Korea’s
East Berlin communist espionage
operation,”
Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, July 8, 1967.
Yun Isang’s photograph is top left
among the ten photographed
figures.
 
Newspaper  coverage  surrounding  the  trials
turned Yun into a poster boy of what was called
“North  Korea’s  East  Berlin  Communist
Espionage  Operation  against  the  South”
(tongbaengnim  kŏjŏm  pukkoedaenam
kongjaktan  sagŏn).  This  term,  coined  by  the
KCIA,  marked  East  Berlin  as  the  center  of
North Korea’s  recruitment of  overseas South
Koreans in Europe for the purpose of deposing
the South Korean state. Reports of the trials
record  the  KCIA’s  determination  to  inflate  a
trip taken by Yun to Pyongyang in 1963 from
Europe, in order to establish him as a spy.27 In
response,  Yun  maintained  that  his  visit  was
motivated by his wish to search for a friend
who had gone to North Korea and to see an
ancient  mural,  which he wished to  use as  a
source of inspiration for a composition. He also
clarified that the money he received from North
Korean  officials  were  personal  gifts,  not
operation funds for espionage, as the KCIA had
alleged.  The  questions  directed  at  Yun  and
retold  in  newspapers  reflected  the  state’s
determination  to  criminalize  a  range  of
diasporic South Korean activities that rested on
the permeability of Cold-War borders in Europe
– for example, socializing with North Koreans
at a North Korean restaurant in East Berlin. 
More sympathetic reports also began to appear
in early December of 1967, a few weeks before
the first trial. Such reports were a response to
the increasing international attention that the
case  of  Yun  and  the  broader  scandal  were
attracting.28  Nevertheless,  an  awareness  of
increased  international  attention  among
domestic journalists did not mean they could
freely introduce foreign coverage surrounding
Yun and the East Berlin Affair.  At this time,
journalists could pay dearly if their reports on
world  affairs  did  not  conform to  the  state’s
position on North Korea. For example, in 1964,
the KCIA jailed the well-known reporter Rhee
Yŏnghi  for  reporting  the  United  Nations’
consideration  of  granting  admission  to  both
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North Korea and South Korea – an objective of
both  states  at  the  t ime. 2 9  Given  such
restrictions,  coverage  of  Yun  had  to  be
carefully framed within the limits of acceptable
discourse.  News reports  tended to  appeal  to
Park’s  generosity  and  underscore  Yun’s
achievement  as  a  composer,  leaving  aside
criticisms of the Park regime in foreign media30.
One of the first articles in this vein reported
that  the  South Korean government  approved
Bonn Opera House’s request for Yun to finish
w r i t i n g  t h e  o p e r a  D i e  W i t w e  d e s
Schmetterlings  (known  as  The  Butterfly
Widow), which was commissioned prior to his
kidnapping to Seoul. This article portrayed the
Park  administration  as  a  magnanimous  body
that  accommodated  a  foreign  cultural
organization and the artist and presented Yun
as  a  genuine  artist  who  was  devoted  to  his
calling even in jail.31 Another trope connected
Yun’s  fate  in  the trial  to  the issue of  South
Korea’s  prestige  in  the  international  arts
community. An article in Kyŏnghyang Sinmun
suggests that Yun’s lawyer pushed this angle. A
quote from the lawyer states: “many foreigners
including  the  international  composer
Stravinsky  are  petitioning  for  a  generous
verdict, and it is hoped that he can continue to
compose  as  a  free  person  so  that  he  can
continue to enhance the nation’s prestige.”32 
The  number  of  reports  citing  international
attention increased after Yun received a death
sentence on December 13, 1967. This increase
reflected  more  robust  campaigns  for  Yun
abroad  as  well  as  pressures  from  the  West
German  and  French  governments.  South
Korean  reports  of  such  campaigns  never
exceeded the  limits  of  domestically  accepted
discourse,  but  they did  convey to  the public
that  an  unprecedented  scale  of  international
attention  was  being  paid  to  a  jailed  South
Korean  artist.  For  example,  a  Kyŏnghyang
Sinmun  feature  on  the  second  trial  (March
1968) drew attention to two West Germans who
attended the trial  as  witnesses and reported
that they vouched for Yun’s patriotism towards
South Korea, commitment to anti-communism,
and low opinion of communist music.33 Several
articles in the summer of 1968 pointed to Yun’s
international  standing by announcing that he
was granted membership  in  West  Germany’s
Hamburg Arts Academy and commissions from
the West German Radio and Mills College in
the United States.34 An article from November
1968 covered a recent performance of  Yun’s
Reak  at  Carnegie  Hall  in  New  York  City
alongside  works  by  stellar  figures  of  the
international avant-garde, such as Charles Ives,
Krzysztof Penderecki, and Milton Babbitt. The
meaning of this report was clear: it advertised
the performance of Yun’s signature Koreanist
work at the heart of the Cold-War free world.
This article also included a translation of the
conductor  Lukas  Foss’s  petition  to  President
Park,  which  he  had  read  aloud  before  the
performance of Reak: 
 
‘I  do  not  know  what  crime  Yun  Isang
committed and I  don't  know the details,
but I know that his works are beautiful and
magnificent,  and  that  they  exclude  any
political intention,’ he stated. ‘Even if his
crime were onerous, we hope that paths
are open so that he can contribute to the
Republic  of  Korea  through  superb
composition  as  a  free  person.’ 3 5
 
All in all, news coverage of Yun Isang in the
course  of  1968  fashioned  a  number  of
narratives  that  would  prove  influential  in
subsequent decades. They framed the artist’s
brilliance, his international reputation, and the
apolitical nature of his works as indications of
his integrity. These reports most likely put at
least  some  pressure  on  Park,  but  they  also
meant that the issues of legal justification and
political  terror  surrounding  the  East  Berlin
Affair could not be raised directly. 
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1969-74:  A  Korean  Representative  in
the European Avant-Garde 
Yun  was  released  in  February  1969  and
returned  to  Berlin  in  March  in  the  face  of
increased  international  criticism  as  well  as
reports  by  a  number  of  South  Korean
journalists who covered the case extensively. In
August  1970,  newspapers reported that  Park
granted a special  presidential  pardon to Yun
and  almost  all  of  the  other  public  figures
arrested in 1967.36 This recourse to presidential
pardon,  at  odds  with  the  severe  penalties
previously  given  to  the  indicted  individuals,
suggests  that  the  Park  regime  wanted  to
extricate  itself  from  a  scandal  that  was
attracting  mounting  international  attention
while still framing Yun and others as criminals
who were forgiven by the state.37  
With  the  pardon  as  a  starting  point,  Yun
became the subject of dozens of articles in the
South Korean press each year until 1975. None
of  them mentioned the  East  Berlin  Affair  or
Yun’s victimhood. Instead, they focused on the
recognition  of  Yun’s  music  in  Western
contemporary music circles. Usually written by
guest  contributors  or  journalists  for  culture
sections, such articles imagined Yun as a kind
of  South  Korean  representative  at  the
international center of contemporary art music.
For  example,  Kim  Chung-gil’s  review  of  the
Donaueschingen Festival in West Germany for
Tonga Ilbo illustrates how young South Korean
composers  like  Kim  understood  Yun  as  a
Korean  representative  in  a  music  scene  too
“advanced” for Asian composers:
 
Because  Yun  Isang  of  Korea  premiered
Reak  in  the  1966  festival  and  received
critical  acclaim,  participants  were
interested in South Korean composers of
contemporary  music.  To  give  a  general
review of the festival in my own way, the
pursuit  for  the  creation  of  new sounds,
new  forms,  and  new  performance
techniques almost made me dizzy. In short,
there will be many problems for Eastern
composers to exceed these composers.38
 
Other than aspiring composers like Kim Chung-
gil,  established  figures  in  South  Korea’s
traditional music praised Yun for using Korea’s
cultural asset as a source material for Western
art music. For example, Han Manyŏng, in an
op-ed for Tonga Ilbo, described Yun’s music as
“a rational explanation of Korean court music”
and considered it a rare example of successful
hybrid work in a crowded scene of “touristic”
fusion music.39 
Favorable appraisals of Yun’s music peaked in
1972, when he was commissioned to write an
opera for the opening ceremony of the 1972
Summer  Olympics  in  Munich.  Newspapers
proudly reported that Yun’s chosen subject for
the opera was Simch’ŏng (spelled Sim Tjong by
Yun), a Korean folktale about a filial daughter
and her blind father. News articles presented
the  opera  Sim  Tjong  as  a  hybrid  work
showcasing  “Taoist,  Buddhist,  or  Confucian
ideology,”40  guided  by  the  composer’s  own
wording of the program.41  Overall,  reports of
Sim Tjong were wrapped in nationalistic fervor.
They treated the performance of the opera as a
sign of Korea’s ascendance in the world (see
Figure  5).  Im  Wŏnsik,  a  South  Korean
conductor who attended the opera in Munich,
voiced  this  sentiment  in  an  interview  with
Kyŏnghyang Sinmun: “when was the last time
that Korea had inspired Western society this
much, in opera or otherwise, in our country’s
long history?”42 
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Figure 5: “Simch’ŏng in the World,”
Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, August 9, 1972. 
 
From 1971 to 1974, Yun’s music appeared in at
least  eleven  concerts  in  South  Korea,
suggesting that the state did not raise objection
to public performances of his music (see Figure
3).  Particularly  notable  were two new music
festivals  held  in  1971.  The  first  of  these,  a
festival  organized  by  the  conservative  Music
Association of Korea, performed Yun’s Loyang,
which used a type of Korean court music that
drew on Tang-dynasty Chinese music as source
material.43  The  second  of  these  programmed
not only Yun’s music but also that of his South
Korean  students  who  had  recently  returned
from  Hanover,  Paik  Byung-dong  and  Kang
Sukhi.44  Park and Kang subsequently became
leading figures in South Korea’s experimental
music  scene.  In  this  way,  Yun  shaped  the
course of new music in his native country from
his diasporic space in West Germany. 
That  Yun’s  music  could  be  praised  and
performed in South Korea from 1971 to 1974
despite  his  prior  charge  and  despite  even
stronger censorship in the early 1970s speaks
to the pervasive nationalistic desire for “free-
world” cosmopolitanism at public and official
levels.  Yun,  as  a  rare  case  of  a  successful
Korean artist in the Cold War’s western bloc,
was  a  compelling  story,  and  as  long  as
references to inconvenient truths were muted,
he  could  be  accommodated  in  the  media.  It
should  be  remembered  that  it  is  partly  this
widespread  desire  for  cosmopolitanism  that
made it possible for dissenting intellectuals and
journalists in South Korea to keep mentioning
Yun’s  name  –  an  implicit  reminder  of  state
v io lence  –  in  pr int  media .  However ,
opportunities  for  even  this  type  of  oblique
resistance largely disappeared when Yun spoke
out  against  Park  at  an  international  press
conference. 
1975-81: Blacklisted
In 1975, there was a sudden drop in references
to  Yun  in  South  Korean  newspapers.  There
were  also  no  reported  performances  of  his
music from 1975 until 1982, suggesting that his
works did not pass the censorship board (see
Figure 3). This silence stood in stark contrast
to Yun’s productivity during this period. From
the  perspective  of  Yun’s  trajectory  as  a
composer, the second half of the 1970s was a
time when he  explored large-scale  concertos
and  orchestral  suites.  These  works,  which
prepared him for a cycle of symphonies in the
1980s,  were  noted  for  expressing  greater
depths.45  Among  his  most  acclaimed  pieces
from this period was his Cello Concerto, which
was premiered at the International Festival in
Royan,  France  in  1976  (see  below).  Critics
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discerned Yun’s experience of suffering in this
piece,  and  Yun  affirmed  that  the  abstract
condition of oppression portrayed in this piece
was  rooted  in  his  personal  experience  of
incarceration. He also added that the cello, his
favorite  instrument,  conveyed  his  voice  and
spirit.46 In addition to this and other concertos,
Yun continued to develop his signature Asianist
style in Muak (1978) and Fanfare and Memorial
(1979). Beyond breakthroughs in composition,
a new teaching position at the Hochschule der
Künste in Berlin gave him the opportunity to
influence a growing number of  students.  His
students in the late 1970s included Hosokawa
Toshio, a Japanese composer who had admired
Yun since hearing a performance of Reak and
Dimensionen in Tokyo in 1971.47
 
Youtube video of Cello Concerto
The imposition of silence in South Korea was a
response  to  Yun’s  leadership  role  in  the
overseas  South  Korean  democratization
movement.  According  to  historian  Gavan
McCormack,  this  movement,  “stirred first  by
government  abductions  and  the  state  terror
tactics  of  the  1960s,”  came  to  have  the
characteristics of an international movement in
the 1970s, with networks of overseas Korean
and  foreign  activists  established  in  Tokyo,
Berlin, and London, among others.48 Activists of
this  movement  spoke  against  the  mounting
violence under Park and sought to create links
between North and South Korea, against the
model  of  competition  and  confrontation  that
gave cover to the Park regime’s human rights
violation.  Yun  worked  with  two  groups  that
played  a  pivotal  role  in  this  movement:
Hanmintong49  (Korean Democratic  Unification
Alliance in Japan), a Zainichi organization, and
Hanminryon50  (Korean  Overseas  Alliance  for
Democratic People’s Unification), an umbrella
group  comprising  dissidents  in  Europe  and
North  America.51  Yun’s  press  conference  in
Tokyo  in  1974  symbolized  coalition  building
between these two groups and presented him
as a leader of this coalition. At this event, he
spoke about his experience of torture by the
KCIA and demanded the release of  Kim Dae
Jung,  then  an  opposition  politician  who  was
abducted from Tokyo by the KCIA in 1973.52 
In 1977, South Korean newspapers broke their
silence on Yun.  They brought  him up in  the
context  of  a  rally  in  Tokyo  that  brought
together Yun and other activists from different
countries.  Reports  of  this  rally  called  them
“anti-Korean (banhan) figures” and supported
the  state’s  position  that  the  Japanese
government  should  not  have  allowed such  a
rally  to  take  place  in  the  first  place.53  An
anonymous  editorial  that  appeared  in
Kyŏnghyang Sinmun is notable for the extent to
which it sounds like government propaganda:
 
It is a real pity there was an anti-Korean
rally  of  approximately  one  hundred
overseas  anti-Korean  figures  in  Tokyo
around Independence Day… It is a widely
known fact that Hanmintong is a Viet Cong
organization that engages in espionage at
the  command  of  North  Korean  puppet
regime… Most of its frontline leaders were
people  who  fled  or  were  expelled  for
committing  corruption  and  all  kinds  of
wicked deeds while they served in public
office in the Republic of Korea… Yun Isang
is someone who actually  received prison
sentence during the East Berlin Affair for
visiting Pyongyang,  and the former U.N.
officer Im Ch’angyŏng had also committed
considerable offence. It is truly absurd that
they go around deceiving good overseas
Koreans  as  they  present  themselves  as
democratic figures or nationalist fighters.54
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The pro-establishment nature of this editorial
exemplif ies  the  self-censoring  media
environment in the last years of the 1970s. At
th is  t ime,  Park  Chung  Hee’s  Yushin
Constitution  (1972-79),  which  gave  sweeping
executive  power  to  the  president  and
suspended  constitutional  freedoms,  posed
additional barriers to autonomous journalism. 
The blacklisting of Yun Isang in the media was
also reproduced in South Korea’s Western art
music scene. This took the form of an exposé of
Im Wŏnsik’s  guest-conducting of  Yun Isang’s
Muak with the Berlin Symphony Orchestra in
Germany,  in  a  1979  issue  of  Wŏlgan  ŭmak
(music  monthly).  Im,  a  prominent  figure  in
South  Korea’s  orchestras  and  elite  music
education,  was  a  longtime  colleague  of  Yun
who had testified on behalf of Yun’s innocence
during  the  East  Berlin  Affair.  He  had  also
attended  Simch’ŏng  in  Munich  in  1972.  The
exposé,  t i t led  “Shocking  News:  The
Performance  of  Yun  Isang’s  Music  Ignites  a
Debate  about  Anti-communism  within  the
Music Scene,” reprinted the concert program
and published commentaries by nine classical
music  professionals  in  South  Korea.  The
majority  of  the commentators disapproved of
Im for collaborating with Yun abroad. A music
critic  stated:  “Yun  Isang  has  committed
considerable offense to Korea. We have avoided
performing  his  music,  and  we  have  been
cautious  in  establishing  relations  with  him.
Therefore,  Im,  who  already  knows  this  well,
should  not  have  gone  to  Germany.”5 5  A
compos i t ion  pro fessor  argued  that
anticommunist nationalism should be a priority
over  questions  of  artistic  value:  “Before
evaluating  Yun’s  works  as  art,  [it  should  be
noted that] it is improper to take interest in it
or to like it. This is common sense known to
every South Korean citizen, so to sympathize
with  a  communist  even  outside  Korea  is  to
deviate from Koreans’ position.”56 A composer
branded  Yun  as  a  threat  to  freedom:  “It  is
possible  to  create  music  freely  and  perform
freely because this country is a free country.
Anyone  who  harms  this  free  country  is  the
enemy  of  this  freedom  and  our  enemy.”57
Overall,  this  published  forum  displayed  the
extent to which key players in South Korea’s
art music community had assimilated the tenets
of establishment discourse in the late 1970s.
1982-87: Chun Doo Hwan’s Bid for Yun
T h e  M a n i c h e a n  d y n a m i c s  t h a t  h a d
characterized the reception of Yun in the 1970s
were  repeated  during  Chun  Doo  Hwan’s
presidency  (1980-87),  Park  Chung  Hee’s
successor  regime  that  also  began  with  a
military coup. Under Chun, the press’s political
conformity was arguably even stronger. This is
because  Chun  imposed  thorough  pre-
publication  censorship  of  newspapers  during
the martial law period (1980) as he sought to
normalize his power in the face of enormous
opposition. During this uncertain time, censors
backed by the Defense Security Command were
dispatched to newspaper headquarters to mute
reports  of  opposition  and  other  inconvenient
news,  particularly  the  brutal  killing  of
demonstrating citizens in  Kwangju in  1980.58
This  iron-fisted  beginning  galvanized
opposition  (which  would  eventually  cause
Chun’s downfall), but it also led to an early co-
optation of key media executives. 
After  Chun  formally  became  the  president
through a rigged election in August 1980, his
media  strategy  became  one  of  diversion.
Sometimes  called  “cultural  policy”  (munhwa
chŏngch’aek), this tactic presented Chun as a
generous steward of cultural liberalization. It
promoted  cultural  hallmarks  of  middle-class
lifestyle to divert  public  attention away from
politics,  especially  the  regime’s  illegitimate
beginning  and  its  brutal  response  to  the
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Kwangju  demonstration.  Indeed,  as  media
historians such as Kang Chunman have pointed
out, it was during Chun’s rule that the state-
enforced  curfew  was  lifted,  professional
baseball was inaugurated, entertainment shows
were  broadcast  in  color  TV,  and  massive
popular  music  festivals  were  offered  to  the
public.59  Classical  music  was  only  a  minor
component of the cultural policy, but like other
spheres of cultural life, it was reshaped to fit
the framework of leisure consumerism in the
early 1980s. The founding of magazines such as
Kaeksŏk  (the  Auditorium)  and  Ŭmaktonga
(Music  East  Asia),  as  well  as  an increase in
classical  music  education,  concerts,  and
recordings expanded the audience for a music
that had previously been tethered to an elite
base. 
A  number  of  reporters  under  the  Chun
administration appealed to the cultural policy
when they  suddenly  brought  up  Yun  Isang’s
name in 1982. In August 1982, they introduced
an upcoming two-day concert dedicated to Yun
in a celebratory tone, seemingly forgetful of the
condemnations four years prior. Their reports
showed  every  indication  of  the  regime’s
sponsorship as well  as collaboration between
the media and the government: they promised
the South Korean premieres of Yun’s orchestral
and  chamber  works  at  two  state-sponsored
theatres  and  praised  the  government’s
intention of “allowing the performance of works
of  artistic  value  regardless  of  the  artist.”60
Coverage  leading  up  to  the  concert  drew
attention  to  the  event’s  international  and
liberal characteristics, in line with the official
cultural  policy  as  well  as  the  cultural
refinement  discourse  that  had  marked  class
aspirations in 1980s South Korea. It advertised
that “classical music aficionados” will have the
chance to purchase scores of over sixty pieces
by  Yun and publicized  a  roster  of  European
musicians  who  were  coming  to  Seoul  to
perform during the event.61  The performance
scene in Seoul also accommodated this sudden
shift:  performers  could  play  Yun’s  pieces  in
public concerts (see Figure 3),  and even the
Tonga Music Concours, an elite competition for
aspiring student performers, included Yun’s art
song Talmuri in its contest repertoire.62
Upon closer reading, it becomes clear that the
sudden embrace of Yun in 1982 was motivated
by the  regime’s  desire  to  coopt  him for  the
1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Cultural policy par
excellence, the Olympics became a buzzword in
South Korean media following the successful
b id  in  1981.  In  the  ear ly  1980s ,  the
government, in collaboration with media elites,
began to set the agenda to meet international
standards during the Olympics, and it was in
this context that the authorities organized “Yun
Isang Night” and made subtle bids for Yun’s
participation. In a 1982 issue of Maeil Kyŏngje,
we  can  find  a  suggestive  appeal  by  Cho
Sanghyŏn,  then  the  president  of  the  Music
Association  of  Korea  and  a  member  of  the
Olympic preparation committee. Previously, he
had  branded  Yun  a  communist  in  the  1979
exposé in Wŏlgan ŭmak. Cho highlighted the
importance  of  “leaving  a  positive  image  of
Korea” during the Olympic Games and ended
his  piece  with  the  following:  “We remember
that  Yun  Isang’s  piece  Simch’ŏng  was
premiered during the opening ceremony of the
Munich Olympics.”63 Around the same time, a
journalist  at  Tonga  Ilbo  also  recommended
opening the Olympics preparation committee to
Yun Isang and “other  artists  of  international
stature  who  cannot  engage  in  domestic
activities  for  various  reasons.”64  Yun  himself
confirmed in a later interview (1993) that the
Chun administration made a private request for
his participation in the Seoul Olympics.65
In the end, Chun’s bid for Yun foundered as
inconvenient news surrounding the composer’s
activities reached South Korea. These included
the  performance  of  Exemplum in  memoriam
Kwangju  in  Cologne  in  1981  and  in  other
European  cities  thereafter.  Exemplum  in
memoriam Kwangju commemorated the victims
of the Kwangju Massacre – the very brutality
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that Chun sought to conceal from the beginning
to the end of his rule. More broadly, this piece
belonged to a series of explicitly political pieces
that Yun composed beginning in the late 1970s.
Such a new direction was a departure from the
generally  non-political  orientation  of  Yun’s
oeuvre  up  to  this  point,  an  orientation  that
could provide cover for the idea that Yun Isang
was a safe composer who was committed to the
idea of Western classical music as “absolute”
music  devoid  of  political  content.  Yun’s
politically  engaged  pieces  around  this  time
alluded to dissident and resistance movements
in South Korea and beyond. For example, Teile
dich Nacht (O Night, Divide, 1980) set to music
political  verses  by  Albrecht  Haushofer,  a
member  of  the  resistance  movement  against
the  Nazi  regime;  the  second  movement  of
Violin Concerto No. 2 (1983) was written for an
antinuclear concert of the Japan Philharmonic
Orchestra;  Naui  Dang,  Naui  Minjokiyo!  (My
Land,  My  People,  1987)  was  an  ode  to  the
peaceful  unification  of  the  Korean  peninsula
and  used  verses  by  dissident  South  Korean
poets.66  Besides  this  activist  strand  in  his
works, Yun’s visit to North Korea in 1984 and
the establishment of the Yun Isang Research
Institute  in  Pyongyang  in  1985  were  other
inconvenient news. After 1984, the number of
performances  of  Yun’s  music  dropped again,
indicating  that  they  did  not  pass  censorship
(see Figure 3). 
In this regard, the Chun administration’s bid
for  Yun  may  also  be  understood  within  the
structure of competition between South Korea
and North Korea. Kim Il Sung had treated Yun
with respect in the 1970s, a period when Yun
justifiably  saw  himself  as  a  victim  of  South
Korean  terror.  In  the  early  1980s,  Kim
continued to court Yun by initiating a number
of  projects  in  the  composer’s  honor.  For
example,  in  the  same  year  that  the  South
Korean authorities staged Yun Isang Night, Kim
Il  Sung  established  an  annual  Yun  Isang
festival,  complete  with  an  orchestra  devoted
exclusively to the performance of Yun’s music.
1988-95: Unwelcome in a “Democratic”
Security State 
In 1988, Yun took the initiative to take on a
more public role involving South Korea. On July
2,  he  held  a  press  conference  in  Tokyo  to
propose a joint North-South concert held near
the  38th  parallel.  This  was  the  composer’s
response  to  the  reforms  that  South  Korean
society was undergoing as a result of the June
Struggle  of  1987,  the  culmination  of  the
democratization movement that had begun in
the 1970s. The June Struggle brought forth a
popular presidential election for the first time
in sixteen years although, ironically, the elected
candidate was Roh Tae Woo, a former general
who had played a leading role in Chun’s 1980
coup.  The  new  administration,  despite
limitations,  initiated  significant  departures.
Most importantly, it allowed greater freedom of
the  press.  The  inauguration  of  the  dissident
newspaper Hankyoreh in 1988 was a notable
development  on  this  front  as  it  meant  the
legalization  of  discourses  that  had  been
previously criminalized. Thanks to the influence
of Hankyoreh, mention of Yun Isang’s name in
news outlets jumped at least tenfold in 1988
compared to 1987. Greater freedom also led to
the  translation  and  publication  of  Luise
Rinser’s  Der  Verwundete  Drache  in  Korean,
adding  to  a  rising  body  of  literature  that
testified to the use of torture during the Park
regime.67 Secondly, Roh promised a departure
from the  confrontational  politics  of  the  Cold
War.  His  July  7,  1988  Statement  envisioned
mutual  exchanges  between South  and  North
Korea and the end of exhaustive competition,
although by 1989 all signs suggested that Roh
had no intention of changing the status quo in
the state’s dealings with North Korea. 
At  Yun’s  press  conference  in  Tokyo  in  July
1988,  he  proposed  a  Joint  National  Music
Festival  involving  representative  symphonies
and choirs of North and South Korea and stated
that  if  the  authorities  in  both  countries
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accepted, he would lead the planning of such
an event with civilian organizations from both
sides.68  Throughout  July  1988,  several  dozen
articles addressed the question of whether the
Roh  administration  would  accept  Yun’s
proposal.69 Initially, the administration did not
issue any response, prompting Hankyoreh and
a  number  of  musicologists  and  musicians  to
urge  government  action.70  When  it  finally
responded,  i t  became  c lear  that  the
government  had  propped  up  the  same  fear-
mongering ideology of national security of its
predecessors (in addition to bureaucratic red
tape),  in spite of Roh’s July 7 statement and
North Korea’s acceptance of Yun’s proposal.71
And establishment  newspapers  soon reverted
to  the  practice  of  endorsing  the  state’s
position.  
We can trace this process of blocking to a late-
July issue of Tonga Ilbo, which published the
government’s  stance  on  Yun’s  proposal.  It
stated that the appropriate offices such as the
Ministry  of  Culture,  the  National  Unification
Board,  and  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs
would  meet  to  discuss  and  decide  on  the
question  of  a  joint  festival  if  Yech’ong,  a
conservative  cultural  organization,  were  to
accept  Yun’s  proposal  and  submit  an
application.72  By  September  1988,  it  was
reported  that  the  festival  proposal  was
withdrawn. A number of reports from October
showed that national security bureaucrats had
blocked Yun. This meddling, brought up during
a  congressional  hearing  in  October,  was
underreported  or  selectively  reported  in  the
press,  but  when  synthesizing  different
accounts,  it  appears  that  the  Minister  of
Foreign Affairs ordered a top National Security
Agency (an’gibu) official to pressure the South
Korean  embassy  in  Germany  to  block  Yun’s
application to contact the Minister.73 
Conversations  between  Yech’ong  and  Yun
resumed in  December  1988,  but  the  festival
was  again  suspended  by  March  1989.  This
time,  the  Roh  administration  and  Yech’ong
could not tolerate the center-left’s enthusiasm
for Yun’s planned visit to South Korea for the
festival.  The  president  of  Yech’ong,  Chŏn
Pongch’o,  wrote  in  the  March  4  issue  of
Kyŏnghyang  Sinmun  that  the  festival  was
suspended  and  blamed  Yun  for  having
communicated  with  a  progressive  cultural
organization  (Minyech’ong)  and  a  welcome
committee in Kwangju. Chŏn stated that such
contacts  suggest  “a  plan  with  political
implications.”74  Another development that the
South  Korean  authorities  could  not  stomach
was  the  performance  of  Yun’s  music  in
Pyongyang in February 1989.75 Fourteen days
after  this  performance,  Kyŏnghyang  Sinmun
announced that the South Korean government
had decided to prohibit the import of records of
Yun’s music performed by the State Symphony
Orchestra of DPRK, the very orchestra that had
played  Yun’s  music  in  Pyongyang.76  The
dynamics  of  disinvitation  surrounding  Yun’s
proposed  festival  suggested  that  the  Roh
administration  had  no  intention  of  allowing
South-North exchanges outside its conservative
national security channels. Indeed, this posture
was reinforced in the course of the 1989, as the
state penalized democratization and unification
activists  who  vis i ted  North  Korea  by
incarcerating  them upon  their  return  to  the
South.
What  is  even  more  remarkable  is  that  the
mechanisms  of  blocking,  disinvitation,  and
state-media collaboration were repeated under
the  Kim Young Sam administration  (1993-8),
which  touted  itself  as  South  Korea’s  first
c i v i l i an  democracy .  Under  the  K im
administration, the organization that sought to
bring Yun to Seoul was Yeŭm, a classical music
marketing  firm.  In  July  1994,  newspapers
announced  that  Yeŭm was  organizing  a  Yun
Isang  Music  Festival  in  September  and  re-
opened  the  question  of  the  composer’s
homecoming.77  Initially,  journalists  wrote
enthusiastically  about  the  prospect  of  the
composer’s  return,  but  soon  they  presented
contradicting  information,  reflecting  the
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anxieties among national security bureaucrats
in the government.  Illustrative in this regard
was  the  July  19  issue  of  Tonga  Ilbo,  which
published contradictory news of Yun’s visit on
the  same  page:  one  article  stated  that  Yun
would  come  to  Korea  in  August  while  the
article  right  next  to  it  stated  that  his
homecoming  was  not  confirmed.78  Within  a
month, Kyŏnghyang Sinmun was casting Yun in
an incriminating light, putting the blame on the
composer for the cancelled visit in 1989 and
underscoring his ties to North Korea.79 
Ultimately,  Yun did not board the flight that
was scheduled to arrive in Seoul on September
3. News articles around this date reveal that
the  question  of  Yun’s  entry  had  prompted
nothing less than a meeting among bureaucrats
in the National Unification Board, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture and Sports,
the Ministry of Justice, and National Security
Agency,  and that  it  was  decided during this
meeting that they would not allow Yun’s entry
if he did not issue “an apology for his pro-North
Korean  activities.”80  To  communicate  this
message  to  Yun,  an  employee  of  the  South
Korean embassy in Berlin went to Yun’s house
on August 31 – only three days before the flight
–  and  requested  that  Yun  issue  an  “official
position that he will never engage in political
activities” as a condition for coming to South
Korea.81  News  articles  also  show  that  there
were  irreconcilable  stances  within  the
government.  Tonga  Ilbo  reported  that  the
government had “initially decided to disallow
Yun’s visit unless he were to issue an apology
for  his  pro-North  Korea  activities,”  but  that
“the  National  Unification  Board  and  high-
ranking  officials”  had  reversed  the  initial
decision  from  a  “humanitarian  standpoint.”82
On  the  other  hand,  Kyŏnghyang  Sinmun
published  the  Department  of  Justice’s  more
aggressive stance that it had not received any
entry application from Yun and that it would
decide on whether or not to admit him after
reviewing  his  purpose  of  visit . 8 3  Yun,
responding  to  these  messages,  indicated
through an interview with Kyŏnghyang Sinmun
(September  2)  that  he  would  board  an
upcoming  f l ight  i f  the  South  Korean
government made it  known that it  welcomed
him.84 The next day, the Department of Justice
announced  through  Tonga  Ilbo  that  “it
absolutely cannot accept Yun’s demand that the
South Korean government issue a message of
welcome.”85  That  was  the  last  message  Yun
heard from the government via newspapers. 
After the failed visit of 1994, the coverage of
Yun outside Hankyoreh moved to the familiar
practice of advertising recognition of his music
in Europe and the United States.86 In November
1995,  journalists  wrote about  Yun’s  death in
West  Germany.  Even these reports  relied on
the  established  trope  of  praising  Yun’s
international  standing  in  contemporary  art
music while leaving untouched the history of
his unjust sufferings under the Park regime. 
Conclusion 
This article traced the reception of Yun Isang in
several mainstream South Korean newspapers
from  1952  to  1995  in  light  of  a  recurring
politics of forgetting that threatened to erase
Yun and his sense of duty to justice and peace
on  the  Korean  peninsula.  In  particular,  it
demonstrated  that  the  figure  of  Yun  was
mediated  by  a  persistent  tension  between
ideologies of national security and a desire for
national  progress  in  the  arts,  two  defining
aspirations  of  Cold-War  South  Korea.  More
broadly, this article explored the collaborative
relationship between the media and the state
as  a  productive  site  of  Cold-War  “truths,”
drawing on scholarship that defines the media-
state nexus as an object of inquiry in examining
postwar histories of South Korea. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  South  Korean
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reception  of  Yun  after  his  death  changed
significantly. With more liberal administrations
in power – from Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) to
Roh  Moo  Hyun  (2003-8)  –  all  restrictions
surrounding Yun’s works were lifted, and his
music  was performed much more frequently.
To cite one year as an example, in 1999, the
opera  Butterfly  Widow  had  a  South  Korean
premiere,  and Angel  in  Flame,  an orchestral
work that memorializes the self-immolation of
student  activists  during  democratization
protests in 1991, was performed in the most
middle-class of classical music events in South
Korea,  the  Seoul  Arts  Center  Symphony
Festival.  Commemorative  projects,  such  as
photo  exhibitions,  documentaries,  and
biographical  novels,  also  emerged  and
culminated in the founding of the Tongyeong
International  Music  Festival  (TIMF),  a
contemporary music festival in Yun’s hometown
Tongyeong,  in  2002.  Nevertheless,  these
projects  did  not  completely  drown out  time-
tested  anti-communist  paranoia,87  and  Yun’s
name became the target of blacklisting again
when a  conservative  government  under  Park
Geun-hye’s  leadership  came  into  power  in
2013. In 2016, the Park administration cut the
budget  that  had been set  aside  for  the  Yun
Isang International Music Competition, as part
of  the  administration’s  blacklisting  and
stigmatization of progressive cultural projects
and  art ists . 8 8  Moreover,  a  number  of
conservative groups have continued to keep a
close watch on developments surrounding Yun,
even  two  decades  after  his  death.  In  2018,
when Yi Suja, Yun’s wife, came to Tongyeong to
bury the composer’s ashes, they staged a series
of  rallies,  demanding  that  his  remains  be
buried in North Korea.89 
The tension that Yun tested for almost three
decades is not a closed chapter belonging to
South  Korea’s  illiberal  past.  This  tension
continues to police the boundaries of cultural
legitimacy, albeit in abated forms, and as long
as the National Security Law continues to exist,
it will be available as a legal basis for shaping
the  parameters  of  cultural  and  moral
legitimacy. Nor is this tension a phenomenon
unique to South Korea. It was an identifiable
feature of Cold War cultures globally, as shown
by the blacklisting of illustrious but dissenting
composers,  such  as  Aaron  Copland,  Leonard
Bernstein,  Dimitri  Shostakovich,  and  Sofia
Gubaidulina,  among  others.  And  today,
powerful  state leaders are grasping onto the
seemingly  outdated  tactic  of  suppressing
dissenting  public  figures  in  the  name  of
national security (or, relatedly, “public safety”
and “law and order”),  whether in the United
States or China. In a world that is witnessing a
visible  return of  such oppressive tactics,  the
story of Yun Isang in South Korea reminds us
how national governments with the aid of the
media can mobilize the fear of an ideological
Other in order to impose their own version of
the truth on their citizens.90
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